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CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IN THE 1965 TERM
OF THE SUPREME COURT
EDITORIAL STAFF
INTRODUCTION
Thirty-nine cases in the 1965 term of the Supreme Court of the
United States touched upon one or more constitutional issues-some of
them minor and incidental to the main issues in Adjudication, but others
contributing significantly to the ongoing dialogue on right of counsel,
self-incrimination, First Amendment freedoms, civil liberties and due
process.
Thus defined, the cases appearing in the following digest fall into
three broad categories: (1) sixteen cases concerning questions of self-
incrimination, right of counsel, and due process or jurisdictional questions
in either civil or criminal law; (2) twelve cases relating to civil liberties
and voting rights, integration and reapportionment; and (3) eleven cases
touching upon personal freedoms generally.
In future editions of this annual summary, it is anticipated that the
subjects covered will extend to include such related public law issues
as anti-trust, trade regulation and interstate commerce; the general pow-
ers of government in reference to administrative processes, legislation and
state-federal relations; and labor relations law. Tax law, for the most
part, will be treated in another quarterly issue of the Law Review
which is devoted exclusively to that specialty.
The purpose of the index-digest which follows is to provide the
student or the practitioner with a summary of these cases as classified
under the foregoing broad headings. The constitutional issue touched
upon in each case is abstracted in proportion to its importance to the
central issue of the case; where the specific case is the subject of an article
or student comment elsewhere in the present issue, there is a cross-
reference and a corresponding reduction in editorial treatment in the
digest. The thirty-nine federal decisions thus treated will, it is hoped,
help to give some perspective to the constitutional law of the United
States as it has developed in the latest term of the Court.
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1. Self-Incrimination, Right of Counsel, Due Process and Jurisdictional
Issues
ALBERTSON AND PROCTOR V. SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES CONTROL BOARD, 382
U. S. 70, 86 S. Ct. 194, 15 L. Ed. 2d 165, 34 Law Wk. 4014. Docket
No. 3. Nov. 15, 1965. Am. Civ. Lib. Union and Nat. Law. Guild,
amici curiae. On certiorari to U. S. Ct. App. for D. C., 118 U.S. App.
D. C. 117, 332 F. 2d 317 (1964). Brennan, J., for the Court; Black,
Clark, JJ., concurring; White, J., did not participate in the decision.
The practical enforceability of the Subversive Activities Control Act
of 1950, 50 U. S. S. C. § 787, has been called into question by this
decision, which held (1) that to compel persons to register as members
of the Communist Party, on forms which stipulated admission of mem-
bership, violated the Fifth Amendment guarantee against self-incrimina-
tion; and (2) that the purported immunity clauses of the Act, since they
did not preclude use of the registry information, could not save the pro-
cedure from constitutional challenge. Although the Court in 1961
upheld the general purposes of the Act in Communist Party v. United
States, 367 U. S. 1, the subsequent conviction of the party for failure
to register under the Act was reversed in 1964, in Communist Party of
the United States v. United States, 116 U. S. App. D. C. 61, 331 F. 2d
807.
The 1961 decision failed to consider the question of individual party
members' liability to self-incrimination. At that time the Court held
that the appeal was premature since specific individuals could not be
definitely identified as being in constitutional jeopardy. Two of the
five-to-four majority in 1961-Justice Frankfurter and Whittaker-are
no longer on the bench, but the chief distinguishing element in the
present case is the fact that the issue was now ripe for adjudication since
specific individuals-Albertson and Proctor-were subject to "onerous
and rapidly mounting penalties" without a decision on the merits of
their claims of constitutional privilege. In his concurring opinion Justice
Clark, a member of the 1961 majority, joined in the reversal because
the current registration requirement "directly abridges the privilege...
against self-incrimination."
Immunity statutes, including Section 4 (f) of the Act of 1950, are
notoriously difficult to uphold in the face of a constitutional challenge.
Since the 1892 case of Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, the
Court has held that where such a statute "leaves the party or witness
subject to prosecution after he answers the criminating question put to
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him," it cannot supplant the privilege guaranteed by the Fifth Amend-
ment. In the case of the 1950 Act, 50 U. S. C. § 783 (f), which stipu-
lated that registration should not constitute evidence of a violation of
this or any other criminal statute and was not to be received in evidence
against such registrant, the Court in its opinion pointed out that this
did not preclude use of the information as an investigatory lead, "a use
which is barred by the privilege."
Taking the three cases-the two Communist Party cases of 1961 and
1964 and the present case-together, the nullification of any practical
governmental capacity to enforce the registration features of the 1950
Act appears to be complete. In 1961 the Court, by the narrowest of
majorities, affirmed the statute as a permissible exercise of legislative
authority but held-in the opinion by Justice Frankfurter himself-that
the question of constitutional privilege was premature so long as there
was a possibility that the Communist Party would comply with the
registration requirements and thus relieve its individual members or
officers of the duty to register. In 1964, the Communist Party having
ignored the final registration order, the United States Court of Appeals
reversed the party's conviction and ruled that the government must
prove that there were persons able and willing to register on behalf of
the party. Now, in the Albertson case, the Supreme Court finds that
such persons are barred from being required to register either on their
own behalf or as agents for the party; an administrative finding by the
Subversive Activities Control Board that they were in fact party mem-
bers, for the purpose of compelling them to register for the party, the
Court found would in itself seriously impair the constitutional immunity
on which the individuals were entitled to rely.
BROOKHART V. JANIS, 382 U. S. 810, 86 S. Ct. 1245, 15 L. Ed. 2d 59, 34
Law Wk. 4221. Docket No. 657. Decided April 18, 1966. On cer-
tiorari to Supreme Court of Ohio, 2 Ohio St. 2d 36, 205 N. E. 2d
911 (1965). Black, J., for the Court; Harlan, J., dissenting in part.
There is a presumption against the waiver of constitutionally guaran-
teed rights, and when a defendant in a criminal case appears not to have
intelligently and intentionally waived his right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses, the trial court may not deny him this right. In this
case, defendant had emphasized in open court that he was not pleading
guilty; his counsel, however, advised the court that his client was agree-
able to a "prima facie trial," which was a practical equivalent to a guilty
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plea. Confrontation of witnesses is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment
and enforceable against the states through the Fourteenth, as asserted in
the 1965 case of Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400.
Since the present case turned entirely upon the principle that de-
fendant's counsel can not override his client's desire not to waive his
rights, the Court left unanswered the question raised by the Pointer case,
whether the constitutional principle limits the admissibility of out-of-
court statements not subject to cross-examination. Justice Harlan ex-
pressed doubt as to whether the defendant, from the record before the
Court, had in fact failed to understand the effect of his counsel's state-
ment to the trial court; he conceded, however, that "general unfamiliarity
... seems to exist with this Ohio 'prima facie' practice."
DEGREGORY v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, 382 U. S.
877, 86 S. Ct. 1148, 15 L. Ed. 2d 118, 34 Law Wk. 4345. Docket No.
396. Decided April 4, 1966. On appeal from Supreme Court of New
Hampshire, 106 N. H. 262, 209 A. 2d 712 (196 ). Douglas, J., for
the Court; Harlan, Stewart and White, JJ., dissenting.
That the First Amendment guarantees freedom of silence as well as
freedom of speech was reaffirmed in this "third round" of the petitioner's
struggle with the New Hampshire Subversive Activities Act of 1951,
N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. c. 533, as amended 1957. The amendment was
precipitated by an earlier ruling of the Court that year, that the state's
investigatory powers could not be extended to private activities which
lacked a sufficient nexus with subversive activities; Sweezy v. Newt
Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234. The following year, DeGregory brought
the first of his three cases to the Supreme Court, where it was dismissed
for want of a substantial Federal question. DeGregory v. Wyman, 360
U. S. 717. In 1961 the Court affirmed per curiam the New Hampshire
Supreme Court's action upholding the use of the contempt power to
compel answer to an inquiry as to present Communist Party member-
ship; DeGregory v. Attorney General, 368 U. S. 19.
In the present case, the Court majority declared that when the inquiry
extended to associations and activities more than ten years earlier-and
substantially after the state six-year statute of limitations for prosecution
had run-"the staleness of both the basis for the investigation and its
subject matter" brought it into conflict with the First Amendment. The
freedom from compulsory speech included in the guarantees of the
First Amendment "prevents the Government from using the power
to .. .probe at will and without relation to existing need."
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Despite continued division of the Court in these cases-seven-to-two,
five-to-four and six-to-three-the decisions buttress the fundamental
rule that (1) there must be a rational and demonstrable relation between
the subject of the public inquiry and the private associations or activities
on which information is sought, and (2) the older the information the
greater the burden on the investigator to establish its pertinence to
present public interest and need. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S.
178 launched this rule (with an eloquent dissent by Mr. Justice Clark) in
1956. In 1958 the Court held that immunity from state scrutiny of
records was an enforceable constitutional right when it was fundamen-
tally related to other constitutional rights which the individual was en-
titled to assert. N. A. A. C. P. v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S.
449. The protection of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was specifically applied to this issue in Bates v. Little Rock, 361
U. S. 516 (1959). Particularly where the information sought is so stale
that its only apparent use is to injure a cause which does not enjoy
majority approval, it is beyond the reach of the investigatory power.
Gibson v. Florida Legis. Invest. Comm., 372 U. S. 539 (1953); and the
power of investigation may be exercised by the states only in areas not
preempted by the Federal government. Comm. of Pennsylvania v.
Nelson, 350 U. S. 497 (1955).
DENNIS v. UNITED STATES, 383 U. S. -- , 86 S. Ct. 1840, - L. Ed. -- ,
34 Law Week. 4556. No. 502. June 20, 1966. On certiorari to the
U. S. Court of Appeals for District of Colorado, 346 F. 2d 10 (1965).
Fortas, J., for the Court; Black and Douglas, JJ., dissenting in part.
The concern of the Court that constitutional safeguards be main-
tained to prevent criminal investigators from ensnaring the innocent
with the culpable, is graphically illustrated in this case. Here the de-
fendants were convicted of conspiracy fraudulently to obtain the
services of the National Labor Relations Board. The convictions were
upheld by the Court of Appeals and certiorari was limited to three
questions: (1) whether the indictment properly stated the offense
(affirmed), (2) whether the pertinent section of the Taft-Hartley Act,
29 U. S. C. § 504, is constitutional (affirmed), and (3) whether the
trial court erred in denying petitioner's motion for production, for
examination, of grand jury testimony of government witnesses (re-
versed).
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While the Court upheld the government on the general constitutional
issue-that one charged with misleading the government by false state-
ments has no standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute he
was evading by his falsehood-the majority (including the dissenters, who
concurred in the ruling on the third question) substantially bolstered the
defendant's rights in its holding on the matter of providing him with
full information on the charges he is required to meet. Recognizing "the
growing realization that disclosure, rather than suppression, of relevant
materials ordinarily promoted the proper administration of criminal
justice," the Court upheld the contention that denial of this portion of
the grand jury record was reversible error. Citing its 1939 opinion in
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, that "after
the grand jury's functions are ended, disclosure is wholly proper where
the ends of justice require it," the Court pointed to the Congressional
enactment of the Jencks Act, 18 U. S. C. § 3500, meeting the issue pro-
pounded in Jencks v. United States, 353 U. S. 657 (1957), by making
available to the defense trial witnesses' pre-trial statements insofar as
they relate to his trial testimony. The Court, in its footnote 17, recites
corroborating case law and professional commentary.
SCHMERBER V. CALIFORNIA, 383 U.S. -- , 86 L. Ed. 1826, -- L. Ed.
-- , No. 658. Decided June 20, 1966. On certiorari to Appellate
Division of California Superior Court. Brennan, J., for the Court;
Warren, C.J., Black, Douglas and Fortas, JJ., dissenting.
"The scope of the privilege against self-incrimination does not coin-
cide with the complex of values it helps to protect," the Court admitted
in affirming, by a five-to-four majority, a ruling that a blood test fol-
lowing an arrest on charge of drunken driving is not inadmissible as a
violation of the Fifth Amendment. Two primary concerns of the
majority in the present case were to restate the Court's position in the
1956 case of Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U. S. 432, and to reconcile this
with some of the implications in Miranda v. Arizona, decided the week
before the present case (see infra). Breithaupt had rejected the Fifth
Amendment plea by relying on the old case of Twining v. New Jersey,
211 U. S. 78 (1908) which had held that the protections of this Amend-
ment did not extend to the states through the Fourteenth. Since this
element of Twining had been superseded by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S.
1 (1963) prohibiting the state from compelling a defendant to "provide
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the state with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature," the
Court in Schmerber concluded that a blood test was not of this nature,
and reaffirmed the rule in Breithaupt.
As for the sweeping propositions in Miranda, the Court in the present
opinion cited Justice Holmes in the 1910 case of Holt v. United States,
218 U. S. 245; the Fifth Amendment guarantee against self-incrimination
prohibits speech or behavior by the defendant which is compulsory, but
did not contemplate "an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may
be material." The Court also rejected a Fourth Amendment argument
that taking the blood sample amounted to unreasonable search and
seizure; the commonplace nature of blood tests in routine clinical ex-
aminations, military induction, marriage license applications and college
admissions satisfied the majority that no constitutional right had been
violated.
TEHAN V. UNITED STATES EX REL. S-oTT, 382 U. S. 406, 86 S. Ct. 459,
15 L. Ed. 2d 453, 34 Law Wk. 4095. No. 52. Decided January 19,
1966. State of California, amicus curiae. On certiorari to the U. S.
Court of Appeals for Sixth Circuit, 337 F. 2d 990 (1964). Stewart,
J., for the Court; Black and Douglas, JJ., dissenting; Warren, C.J., and
Fortas, J., did not participate. Vacated and remanded.
Adverse comment by prosecutor or trial judge in defendant's failure
to'testify in a state criminal proceeding violates federal guarantees against
self-incrimination. But this rule is not to be given retroactive applica-
tion; the Court concluded, thus settling the question raised in Griffin v.
California, 380 U. S. 609 (1965). The Griffin case had struck down a
California practice permitting such comment, which had been followed
in that state since its 1934 constitution. California, accordingly, filed
its amicus brief pointing to the "thousands of convictions" which would
be overturned if the Griffin rule were to become indefinitely retroactive
as suggested by Shott.
The "complex of values" represented broadly by the privilege against
self-incrimination was again alluded to by the Court in this opinion (see
its footnote 12), and was summarized in the Griffin case as the require-
ment that government, either federal or state, be "compelled to establish
guilt by evidence independently and freely secured, and ...not by
coercion." Balancing this, as in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618
(1964), the Court held that constitutional law does not automatically
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invest with retroactivity a decision which overturns previously estab-
lished legal doctrine. In the words of Chief Justice Hughes, "the past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration." Cf. Chicot
County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U. S. 371 (1939).
The new judicial declarations have come in rapid succession in this
subject-area: In 1964 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1 overturned a rule
in Twining v. New Jersey, 338 U. S. 25 (1908) and applied the Fifth
Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination to the states through
the Fourteenth. In 1961 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 overturned Wolf
v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) and held inadmissible evidence which
was obtained by unconstitutional seizure. Linkletter thereafter limited
the Mapp doctrine as-to retroactivity, and Tehan now limits the Griffin
doctrine in the same respect.
See also Johnson and Cassidy v. New Jersey, infra.
BAXSTROM v. HEROLD, 383 U. S. 107, 86 S. Ct. 760, 15 L. Ed. 2d 620, 34
Law Vk. 4158. No. 219. Decided February 23, 1966. On certiorari
to the Court of Appeals of New York, 253 N. Y. S. 2d 1028, 202 N. E.
2d 159 (19 ). Warren, C.J., for the Court; Black, J., concurring.
Reversed and remanded.
Equal protection of the laws, under the Fourteenth Amendment, in-
sures a jury trial for a mentally ill criminal defendant on the question
of his sanity, a unanimous Court held in this case. Thus the Court
opened a new area of constitutional dialogue concerning guarantees
affecting the insane and other incompetents-an almost predictable next
step in the steady extension of recent decisions insisting upon full accom-
modation of the individual's rights in both civil and criminal proceedings.
Petitioner here had been declared mentally ill while serving his sen-
tence following a criminal conviction. As his sentence term was ap-
proaching completion, state authorities undertook to insure his continued
detention in the hospital to which he had been transferred. Petitioner
contended he was denied equal protection of the laws in that he was not
afforded a jury review of the question of his sanity as was provided for
others in instances of civil commitment to a mental institution. He also
insisted that he was entitled to a hearing on the question of the degree
of mental illness-i. e., whether it warranted his remaining in a prison
hospital-as was accorded to others in like circumstances. On both of
these issues the Court sustained the petitioner: "Equal protection does
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not require that all persons be dealt with identically, but it does require
that a distinction made have some relevance to the purpose for which
the classification was made."
The emphasis with which the Court expressed this sweeping constitu-
tional guarantee, coming at the time of the opinions in the Miranda
and related cases which follow, indicates that the constitutional protec-
tion of individual rights will continue to be enlarged in subject-matter,
however they may be limited in retroactive effect.
See also Pate v. Robinson, infra.
JOHNSON AND CASSIDY V. NEW JERSEY, U. S. 86 S. Ct. 1772,
L. Ed. Law Wk. No. 762. Decided June 20, 1966. On
certiorari to the New Jersey Supreme Court. Nat. Dist. Attys.
Assn., amicus curiae. Warren, C.J., for the Court; Black and Douglas,
JJ., dissenting. Affirmed.
Taken with the "second round Escobedo" cases cited below, this
decision substantially rounds out the right to counsel issue by holding
the Escobedo doctrine to be prospective only. These related cases will
be the subject of a professional study in the next issue of the William
and Mary Law Review.
AMIRANDA v. ARIZONA, VIGNERA V. NEW YORK, WESTOVER V. UNITED
STATES, CALIFORNIA V. STEWART, U. S. , 86 S. Ct. 1602, L.
Ed. Law Wk. Nos. 759-761, 584. Decided June 13, 1966.
On certiorari to the Supreme Court of Arizona, 98 Ariz. 18, 401 P.
2d 721 (19 ); to the Court of Appeals of New York, 259 N. Y. S.
2d 857, 207 N. E. 2d 527 (19 ); to the U. S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, 342 F. 2d 684 (19 ); and to the Supreme Court
of California, 62 Calif. 2d 571, 400 P. 2d 97 (19 ). State of New
York and Nat. Dist. Attys. Assn., amici curiae. Warren, C.J., for the
Court; Harlan, Stewart and White, JJ., dissenting and Clark, J., dis-
senting in part. Reversed as to the first three cases and affirmed as to
the fourth.
The "second round Escobedo" decisions, expanding the Court's rule
that evidence obtained by incommunicado interrogation of defendants
is inadmissible under the self-incrimination prohibition of the Fifth
Amendment, is reviewed at length in the article to which reference
is made in the preceding case.
RiNALDI V. YEAGER, 383 U.S. -- , 86 S. Ct. 1497, 15 L. Ed. 2d -. No
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940. Decided May 31, 1966. On appeal from three-judge U. S. Dis-
trict Court for District of New Jersey, 238 F. S. 960 (1965). Stewart,
J., for the Court; Harlan, J., dissenting. Reversed and remanded.
The equal protection clause prohibits discrimination between indigent
defendants whose appeals are unsuccessful and those who receive sus-
pended sentences, in the matter of liability to reimburse the county from
institutional earnings. The Court in this case found the New Jersey stat-
ute on the subject, N. J. S. A. 2A: 152-18 in conflict with the Fourteenth
Amendment. While the state argued that the legislation applied to all
unsuccessful appellants in criminal convictions, the Court declared: "The
Equal Protection clause requires more of a state law than non-discrimina-
tory application within the class it establishes. .. It also imposes a re-
quirement of some rationality in the nature of the class singled out." Cf.
Baxstrom v. Herold, supra. See also Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, infra.
UNITED STATES V. ROMANO, 382 U.S. 136, 86 S. Ct. 279, 15 L. Ed. 2d
210, 34 Law Wk. 4022. No. 2. Decided November 22, 1965. On
certiorari to the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 330
F. 2d 566 (1964). White, J., for the Court; Black, Douglas and
Fortas, JJ., concurring. Affirmed.
A statutory inference of guilt-i. e., legislative formula whereby proof
of one set of facts is sufficient evidence of the ultimate fact on which
guilt is predicated-violates the guarantees of the Fifth Amendment. See
COMMENT, infra, this issue.
DAvis v. NORTH CAROLINA, 383 U. S. -- , 86 S. Ct. 1761, 15 L. Ed. 2d
-. No. 815. Decided June 20, 1966. On certiorari to U. S. Court
of Appeals for Fourth Circuit, 339 F. 2d 770 (1964). Warren, C. J.,
for the Court; Black, J., concurring; Clark and Harlan, JJ., dissenting.
Reversed and remanded.
Confessions not made voluntarily, whether true or false, are consti-
tutionally inadmissible as evidence, the Court here reiterated. To de-
termine the fact of voluntariness, the Court asserted its obligation to
examine the entire record, and emphasized that its ruling in Miranda v.
Arizona was to be broadly applied. But note also Justice Clark's protest
that the rule in Johnson and Cassidy v. New Jersey, supra, against
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retroactivity of the Miranda doctrine should apply to the instant case.
The majority opinion is also compelled to face the pragmatic fact that
defendant, as an escapee, would normally be kept under maximum
security; it nevertheless holds that any interrogation about another
crime, while defendant is in isolated detention for escape, is unconsti-
tutionally coercive. The dissent questions whether the Court can or has
properly distinguished between detention of an escapee and detention
of a suspect, particularly where the record indicates that the present de-
fendant was only occasionally questioned and was not actually incom-
municado.
However, the majority opinion is consistent with the general tenor
of recent constitutional decisions, which insist that whatever rights the
individual may claim under the Constitution are to be preserved to him in
all circumstances and at all times.
GIAccIo V. PENNSYL VANIA, 382 U. S. 399, 86 S. Ct. 518, 15 L. Ed. 2d
447, 34 Law Wk. 4099. No. 47. Decided January 19, 1966. On
appeal from the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Eastern District, 415
Pa. 139, 202 A. 2d 55 (1964). Black, J., for the Court; Fortas and
Stewart, JJ., concurring. Reversed and remanded.
A state statute permitting court to assess costs of criminal prosecution
to a successful defendant violates the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. A Pennsylvania statute of 1860, Pa. Stat. Ann. Tit.
19 § 1222 (1963) authorized the taxing of costs to defendants even
when acquitted under a "sentence to that effect." The Supreme Court
unanimously-although somewhat belatedly-voided the statute; in the
concurring opinion of Justice Stewart, it "violates the most rudimentary
concept of due process of law." This is more affirmative than the ma-
jority opinion which simply finds the statute void for vagueness and
thereby enabling the state to implement "a procedure for depriving an
acquitted defendant of his liberty and his property."
The state contended, and the original legislation apparently was
founded on the proposition, that the statute was analogous to the pro-
visions of collecting costs in civil cases. The majority dismissed this
argument with the observation that the Fourteenth Amendment protects
the individual "against any state deprivation which does not meet the
standards of due process." It might have struck down the issue yet
more vigorously by observing that in most jurisdictions the costs of liti-
gation are taxed to the losing party only. But the more objectionable
1966]
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effect of the statute, the majority noted, was that it enabled a jury to
levy a pecuniary penalty upon a defendant where, in the words of the
charge to the jury, "he has been guilty of some misconduct less than
the offense which is charged but nevertheless misconduct of some
kind... " The Court found this a flaw deriving from the vagueness of
the statutory procedure; it might have added that the statute as a whole,
as appellant's brief expressed it, gave a jury virtually a free hand to
substitute any penalty it wanted to as a penalty for any behavior of the
accused which it did not like, even if the behavior was constitutionally
protected.
JAMES v. LOuISIANA, 382 U. S. 36, 86 S. Ct. 151, 15 L. Ed. 2d 30, 34
Law Wk. --. No. 23, Misc. Decided October 18, 1965. On cer-
tiorari to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, 246 La. 1033, 169 S. 2d
89 (19 ). Per curiam. Reversed and remanded.
Search of accused's home is not an incident of his arrest two blocks
away, and evidence gathered in this search is constitutionally inad-
missible. The Court in this brief opinion made clear that it stands by
the doctrine of illegal search in AlIapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961) and
Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23 (1963). Specifically, it reiterated the
stipulation in Stoner v. California, 376 U. S. 483 (1963) that search
incidental to arrest must be "substantially contemporaneous" and "con-
fined to the immediate vicinity of the arrest." Whether compliance with
these conditions will be the test of the validity of the new "stop and
frisk" laws as they may be admitted to review, is presently only an
interesting speculation.
PATE V. ROBINsON, 383 U. S. 375, 86 S. Ct. 836, 15 L. Ed. 2d 815, 34
Law Wk. 4185. No. 382. Decided March 7, 1966. On certiorari to
the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 345 F. 2d 691
(1965). Clark, J., for the Court; Black and Harlan, JJ., dissenting.
Affirmed and remanded.
Where defendant has not waived the question of his competence to
stand trial, failure of the trial court to hold hearing on that question
violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. And
upon determination that defendant's rights were thus abridged, a writ
of habeas corpus will issue and the defendant must be discharged by
the state unless given a new trial within a reasonable time. The Court
[Vol. 8:49
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observed that "it is contradictory to argue that a defendant may be in-
competent, and yet knowingly or intelligently 'waive' his right to have
the court determine his capacity to stand trial."
In remanding the case, the Court reiterated its doctrine in Rogers v.
Richmond, 365 U. S. 534 (1961) NW hich laid down that a defendant
had a right "to have all issues which may be determinative of his guilt
tried . . . under appropriate state procedures which conform to the
requirements of the Fourtenth Amendment." However, it significantly
differentiated Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 (1964) which imposed
upon the state the obligation to accord the accused a separate hearing
on the voluntariness of his confession. The obligation is concurrent with
the original trial, the Court said in Pate; where a substantial span of
years has intervened before habeas corpus issues, "the difficulty of
retrospectively determining an accused's competence to stand trial"
virtually insures his discharge.
Compare Sheppard v. Maxwell, infra.
UNITED STATES V. EWELL AND DENNIS, 383 U. S. 116, 86 S. Ct. 773,
15 L. Ed. 2d 627, 34 Law Wk. 4154. No. 29. Decided February 23,
1966. On appeal from the United States District Court for Southern
District of Indiana, 242 F. S. 166 and 451 (1964). White, J., for the
Court; Brennan, J., concurring; Douglas and Fortas, JJ., dissenting.
The right to a speedy trial, under the Sixth Amendment, does not
mean that criminal procedure should not be at a deliberate pace; indeed,
this pace itself is part of the safeguarding of the rights of the accused.
Nor does double jeopardy arise from successive prosecutions for two
offenses which are not the same. Thus the Court denied contentions
of defendants where they had been convicted and sentenced under an
indictment believed valid, released upon finding of the indictment's in-
validity, and promptly rearrested and reindicted for a related offense.
The majority opinion stresses that the speedy trial clause may under
certain circumstances contribute to double jeopardy, and that any
prosecution within the limits of the applicable statute of limitations
would normally satisfy the former clause. Absent any showing of dis-
appearance of evidence or witnesses, defendants cannot be heard to
allege that a reasonable time interval between original arrest and present
trial has prejudiced a constitutional guarantee.
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BRADLEY V. SCHOOL BOARD OF RICHMOND. GILLIAM V. SCHOOL BOARD
OF HOPEWELL, 382 U. S. 103, 86 S. Ct. 224,15 L. Ed. 2d 187. Docket
Nos. 415, 416. Decided November 15, 1965. On certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 345 F. 2d 310,
325 (1965). Per curiam. Vacated and remanded.
Faculty desegregation follows logically upon pupil desegregation,
ruled the Court in adding this latest judicial dimension in the dozen
years since Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954). Plans
in two Virginia cities-Richmond and Hopewell-were challenged by
parents and pupils contending that faculty allocation on an alleged racial
basis rendered inadequate the District Court-approved program of school
desegregation. Without passing at this time on the merits of the pro-
gram itself, the Supreme Court found the petitioners entitled to a full
evidentiary hearing on this question.
BROWN ET AL. V. STATE OF LouIsIANA, 383 U. S. 131, 86 S. Ct. 719, 15
L. Ed. 2d 637, 34 Law Wk. 4143. Docket No. 41. Decided February
23, 1966. On certiorari to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, 246 La.
878, 168 S. 2d 104 (19 ). Fortas, J., for the Court; Brennan and
White, JJ., concurring; Black, Clark, Harlan and Stewart, JJ., dis-
senting. Reversed.
By a 3-1-1-4 distribution of opinions, the Court in this case narrowly
overturned a state breach of the peace statute by a constitutional ra-
tionale which, in Mr. Justice Black's phrase, inhibits the states in their
efforts to control demonstrations of protest against state public policies.
The case follows on the heels of a group of sit-in cases which tested
the public accommodations guarantees of various civil rights laws; its
primary distinction is that it involved a public library rather than a
privately operated business. Thus, from Louisiana alone, have come
earlier cases involving Negro sit-ins at lunch counters adjudicated in
Garner v. State of Louisiana, 368 U. S. 157 (1961), Negro sit-ins in a
bus depot segregated waiting room, supported in Taylor v. State of
Louisiana, 370 U.S. 154 (1961), and the use of public streets for demon-
stration purposes, protected by Cox v. State of Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536
(1964).
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
The Cox case involved the same state statute as did the current case,
and the Court in three of the four separate opinions went to consider-
able lengths to elaborate upon or distinguish from the earlier decision.
The opinion of the Court read by Mr. Justice Fortas insisted that a
breach of peace must be actual-reminiscent of the "overt act" doctrine
enunciated almost thirty years ago in Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S.
353 (1937) and more recently asserted in contemporary context in
Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229 (196 )-and that "protest by
silent and reproachful presence" cannot be held to be lawless wherever
it occurs. Mr. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion struck at the "over-
breadth" or sweeping inclusiveness of the breach of peace statute as em-
powering the enforcing officers to find an overt act in any conduct which
tends "to arouse from a state of repose" or "to disquiet" the party toward
whom the protest is directed.
Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the four dissenters, declared it was
"high time to challenge the assumption in which too many people have
too long acquiesced, that groups that think they have been mistreated
or that have actually been mistreated have a constitutional right to use
the public's streets, buildings and property to protest whatever, wherever,
whenever they want, without regard to whom it may disturb." The
First Amendment, declared the Justice who has been its most zealous
advocate, ought not to be held to authorize the use of private or public
property, dedicated to other purposes, "as a stage to express dissident
ideas." Negroes as an exploited group "which more than any other
has needed a government of equal laws and equal justice," are en-
couraged by the majority opinion, says the dissent, to take into the
group's hands the law as to the time and place of protest.
In view of the divided majority and the cogent critique of the Court's
most convinced and dedicated liberal constructionist, Brown v. State of
Louisiana may mark the extreme in a pendulum swing of judicial per-
suasion.
EvANs v. NEWTON, 382 U. S. 296, 86 S. Ct. 486, 15 L. Ed. 2d 373, 34
Law Wk. 4078. Docket No. 61. Decided January 17, 1966. On cer-
tiorari to the Supreme Court of Georgia, 220 Ga. 280, 138 S. E. 2d
573 (1964). United States as amicus curiae. Douglas, J., for the
Court; White, J., concurring; Black, Harlan and Stewart, JJ., dis-
senting. Reversed.
Extending the doctrine that the equal protection clause may override
discriminatory terms in a charitable trust, where the subject of the
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trust is "entwined with governmental policies or... impregnated with
a governmental character", the Court majority here held that a city
could not divest itself of responsibility for nondiscrimination by re-
moving itself as trustee. See COMMENT, infra.
ROGERS V. PAUL, 382 U. S. 198, 86 S. Ct. 358, 15 L. Ed. 2d 265.
Docket No. 532. Decided December 6, 1965. On certiorari to the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 345 F. 2d 117 (19 ). Per
curiam; Clark, Fortas, Harlan and White, JJ., for argument and plen-
ary consideration. Vacated and remanded.
Another of the desegregation cases of the 1965 term, the present liti-
gation affirmed the standing of students in segregated schools to chal-
lenge racial allocation of faculty which tended to deny them equal op-
portunity for education. The principal doctrine in this case is that where
an otherwise acceptable program of progressive desegregation denies
a constitutional right to parties in still-segregated schools, they have
a right to immediate relief. As in the Bradley case, supra, the Court is
manifestly concerned at the states' reliance on "deliberate" rather than
on "speed" in the "all deliberate speed" rule of desegregation handed
down in the second review of Browun v. Board of Education, 349 U. S.
294 (1955).
SHUTTLESWORTH V. BIRMINGHAM, 382 U. S. 87, 86 S. Ct. 211, 15 L. Ed.
2d 176, 39 Law Wk. 4009. No. 5. Decided November 5, 1965. On
certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Alabama, 42 Ala. App. 296, 161
S. 2d 796. Stewart, J., for the Court, Brennan, Douglas and Fortas,
JJ., and Warren, C. J., concurring. Reversed and remanded.
In another of the local laws challenged by civil rights demonstrators
as being construed to obstruct them in the exercise of their constitu-
tional rights, an Alabama municipal ordinance against loitering in public
ways was tested by this case. The Court, without dissent but with four
concurring opinions which dilute the impact of the holding, found that
the Fourteenth Amendment protected one exercising his right to pro-
test in the public way. In distinguishing between an order to move from
the public way because of the unpopularity of the protest, and an
order to move because of obstructing traffic-the first to be disregarded
because unconstitutional, the second to be obeyed if no reasonable doubt
enters into the factual situation. Just how, in the heat of emotion on
the spot, this distinction is to be made and validated, remains to be seen.
Cf. Brown v. Louisiana, supra.
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HARPER V. VIRGINIA BOARD OF ELECTIONS, BUTTS v. HARRISON. 383 U. S.
663, 86 S. Ct. 1079, -- L. Ed. -, 34 Law Wk. 4305. Docket Nos.
48, 655. Decided March 24, 1966. On appeal from the U. S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, United States as amicus
curiae. Douglas, J., for the Court; Black, Harlan and Stewart, JJ.,
dissenting. Reversed.
The coup de grace to state poll taxes was applied in this opinion
holding such taxes to violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, when made a prerequisite for voting. See CURRENT DE-
cisioNs, infra.
KATZENBACH V. MORGAN. NEW YORK BOARD OF ELECTIONS V. MORGAN.
383 U. S. -, 86 S. Ct. 1717, 15 L. Ed 2d --. Docket Nos. 847, 877.
Decided June 13, 1966. On appeal from the statutory three-judge
District Court for the District of Columbia, 247 F. S. 196 (1965).
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and State of New York, amici curiae.
Brennan, J., for the Court; Douglas, J., concurring in part; Harlan
and Stewart, JJ., dissenting. Reversed.
Federal guarantees of voting rights extend to qualified non-English
speaking citizens, the Court ruled in this and the companion case of
Cardona v. Power, 383 U. S. - uphold Section 4 (e) of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 437, 42 U. S. C. 1973b (e). Accordingly,
a state law requiring proof of literacy in English was held to be unen-
forceable insofar as it might be inconsistent with the Federal Act, thus
opening the polls to several hundred thousand Spanish-speaking persons
who had migrated from Puerto Rico and who were otherwise qualified
as citizens.
The majority opinion embodies an unusually detailed review of con-
stitutional theory, in reply to the argument of counsel for New York
that under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment ("The Congress shall
have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article") there must be judicial determination of the "appropriateness"
of the legislation. Mr. Justice Brennan in his opinion equated § 5 with
the "necessary and proper" clause of Article I, § 8 of the Constitution
and then defined the scope of the latter by quoting Chief Justice Marshall
in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 315 (1819): "Let the end be ap-
propriate, . . . and all means which are . . .plainly adapted to that
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end ...are constitutional." Citing the Congressional history of the
Voting Rights Act to show that Section 4 (e) was "plainly adapted"
to enforcing the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the opinion has no difficulty in finding that "the end [is] legitimate,"
i. e., its objective is to enforce the constitutional rights of Spanish-speak-
ing citizens to participate in elections.
The practical difficulty of applying this formula is demonstrated in
the companion Cardona case, where the majority opinion, again by
Mr. Justice Brennan, rested upon the evidence (or rather the lack of
evidence) that the prospective voter-plaintiff had failed to allege suc-
cessful completion of a sixth-grade education in a Puerto Rican Spanish-
language school. In this case Justices Douglas and Fortas joined Justices
Harlan and Stewart in dissent; the learned disquisition on "appropriate-
ness" and "adaptation" of Congressional legislation within the consti-
tutional orbit, said the dissent, is beside the point. The basic issue-a
constitutional one?-said the dissenters, was whether literacy is actually
a prerequisite for exercise of the electoral franchise. By adding Spanish
(or any foreign language) to English as a test of voting competence,
the Court has added a larger bloc of individuals to the electorate; whether
literacy in any language is a proper limitation upon the equal protection
clause in this context remains unanswered.
SOUTH CAROLINA v. KATZENBACH, 383 U. S. 301, 86 S. Ct. 807, 15
L. Ed. 2d 769, 34 Law Wk. 4207. Docket No. 22. Decided March
7, 1966. Original bill in equity. Alabama, California, Georgia, Illinois,
Louisiana, Massachusetts (joined with Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, New York,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, West
Virginia and Wisconsin), Mississippi and Virginia, amici curiae. War-
ren, C. J., for the Court; Black, J., dissenting in part. Dismissed.
The constitutionality of certain provisions of the Voting Rights Act
of 1965-suspension of eligibility tests, review of proposed changes in
voting procedures, appointment of federal voting examiners and en-
forcement proceedings in criminal contempt, inter alia-was tested in
this original action and upheld. See CuRRENT DECISIONS, infra.
BURNS v. RICHARDSON. CRAVALHO v. RICHARDSON. ABE v. RICHARDSON.
382 U. S. 807, 86 S. Ct. 1286, 15 L. Ed. 2d -- , 34 Law Wk. 4365.
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Docket Nos. 318, 323, 409. Decided April 25, 1966. On appeal from
a three-judge panel of the District Court for the District of Hawaii,
238 F. S. 468 (1965), 240 F. S. 724 (1965). Brennan, J., for the Court;
Harlan and Stewart, JJ., concurring in the result. Fortas, J., took no
part in this case. Vacated and remanded.
The only reapportionment case in the 1965 term involved the question
first raised in the Georgia case of Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433
(1965), concerning the validity of multi-member electoral districts.
Affirming, as in Fortson, the creation of multi-member districts in
principle while reiterating that they would be invalid where they could
be shown to cancel out the voting strength of minority groups, the Court
upheld the interim reapportionment plan for the Hawaiian senate. The
Court also settled a new issue in the reapportionment question by holding
that Hawaii could base its plan on the number of registered voters in
a district rather than on total population-again with a qualification,
that the results in representation are substantially the same. The Court
pointed out that special circumstances in Hawaii-i. e., large numbers of
transient tourists and military personnel-tended to distort statistics on
the true distribution of state citizenry.
Within these laboriously circumscribed areas, the Burns decision in-
dicates a disposition of the Supreme Court to permit the individual
states to work out their specific reapportionment procedures with reason-
able variations. The fact that in Burns an interim plan was involved
further accounts for the willingness of the Court to give the state the
benefit of the doubt. Until it can be established that a state is guilty of
undue delay in drafting an acceptable reapportionment plan, or that the
plan in whole or in part violates the guidelines set down in the progres-
sion of cases from Baker v. Carr, U. S. (19 ) through Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533 (19 ) to Davis v. Mann, 377 U. S. 678 (1964)
and related cases, the present opinion appears to invite judicial restraint
in this subject-area. In short, the Court encourages reapportionment by
state legislative action rather than by Federal judiciary.
GEORGIA v. RACHEL, 383 U. S. -, 86 S. Ct. 1783, 15 L. Ed. 2d -, 34
Law Wk. 4563. Docket No. 147. Decided June 20, 1966. On cer-
tiorari to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 342 F. 2d 336, 909
(1965). Stewart, J., for the Court; Warren, C. J., Brennan, Douglas
and Fortas concurring. Affirmed.
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Where individuals are threatened with prosecution in state courts for
peaceable efforts to assert Federally protected rights, they are entitled
to have the cause removed to a Federal court, under the provisions of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 201 (a), 203, 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000a (a),
2000a-2. The fundamental requisite, as the Court was at pains to em-
phasize in this case and the Peacock case, infra, is that there must be a
factual basis for the prediction that a state court proceeding will pre-
clude the assertion of Federally protected rights. In the present case
the Court satisfied itself that under the Georgia trespass statute, Ga.
Code Ann. § 26-3005 (1965 Cum. Supp.), petitioners would be denied
constitutional rights by virtue of local statute and custom, and that the
acts (sit-ins in privately owned restaurants) were done under color of
authority of the Constitution.
The majority opinion reviews in some detail the development of civil
rights and removal statutes in Congress, from 1863 to 1964. The con-
curring opinion emphasizes that the right to be protected is the right to
be free from prosecution when asserting a constitutional guarantee-not
the right to have a trespass conviction reversed. Thus it follows that the
cause must be insulated from the state's criminal process if it is to be
wholly vindicated.
GREENWOOD, MISS. V. PEACOCK. PEACOCK v. GREENWOOD, Miss. 383
U. S. -, 86 S. Ct. 1800, 15 L. Ed. 2d -- , 34 Law Wk. 4572. Docket
Nos. 471, 649. Decided June 20, 1966. United States as amicus curiae.
On certiorari to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 347 F. 2d
679, 986 (1965). Stewart, J., for the Court; Warren, C.J., and Bren-
nan, Douglas and Fortas, JJ., dissenting. Reversed.
The concurring opinion of the Rachel case, supra, becomes a dissent
in this case, and accordingly underlines the narrow dividing line be-
tween the constitutional privilege and the presumption that the privilege
will be denied. The majority opinion, written in both cases by Mr.
Justice Stewart, sees the Peacock issue as "far different" from that in
Rachel; the dissent-written in both cases by Mr. Justice Douglas-
finds a difference only in the "narrow, cramped meaning" ascribed by
the majority to the statutory construction. The difference, according to
the majority, is that in Rachel the defendants relied on a specific pro-
vision in a preemptive Federal law, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (supra),
whereas in Peacock the defendants could cite no Federal statute vesting
an absolute constitutional privilege in them and inhibiting the states from
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prosecution. To block the public streets, as the defendants were charged
with doing, is an offense properly within the police power of the state,
and the denial of a constitutional right, if any, arises from evidence that
any conviction on these charges was a result of racial prejudice.
3. Personal Liberties Generally
ELFBRANDT v. RUSSELL, 383 U. S. , 86 S. Ct. 1238, 15 L. Ed. 2d
34 Law Wk. 4347. No. 656. Decided April 18, 1966. On certiorari
to the Supreme Court of Arizona, 97 Ariz. 140, 377 P. 2d 944 (19 ).
Douglas, J., for the Court; White, Clark, Harlan and Stewart, JJ.,
dissenting. Reversed.
Again the doctrine of impermissible overbreadth in state laws which
tend to limit constitutionally guaranteed rights was applied by the
Court majority in this case involving a teacher's loyalty oath. The
overbreadth derived from a sweeping revision in 1961 of the Arizona
Communist Control Act, A. R. S. § 38-231, which greatly enlarged a
statute in existence since 1901, which in turn had been made applicable
to teachers in 1935. A. R. S. § 15-231. The 1961 revision was chal-
lenged by the present petitioner, 94 Ariz. 1, 381 P. 2d 554 (1963),
certiorari then granted and case remanded by the Supreme Court, 378
U. S. 127 (1964) in the light of the Court's ruling against a Washing-
ton state loyalty oath law as void for vagueness. Baggett v. Bullitt,
377 U. S. 360 (1964). Finding no vagueness in its own statute, the
Arizona court reaffirmed its former position and set the stage for the
Supreme Court this time to apply the "overbreadth" doctrine.
A statute potentially touching protected rights must be narrowly
drawn to reach only conduct which the state has a right to penalize
and to avoid jeopardizing the rights which are guaranteed to the indi-
vidual, the Court declared, reiterating its position in Cantrell v. State
of Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (19 ). By attempting to confine its
own adjudication in the present case to this proposition, the Court
apparently hoped-and probably without success-to avoid the impli-
cation that Elfbrandt (1966) nullifies much of the decisional law of the
postwar Vinson Court in this area which sustained state loyalty oaths.
Cf. Garner v. Los Angeles Bd. of Supervisors, 341 U. S. 716 (19 ),
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Gerende v. Bd. of Supervisors, 341 U. S. 46 (19 ) and Adler v. Bd.
of Education, 342 U. S. 485 (19 ). In view of the majority observa-
tion that individuals "who join an organization but do not share its
unlawful purposes . . . pose no threat, either as citizens or as public
employees," the present case has reduced the test to the "specific intent"
rule set out in Apteker v. Sec. of State, 378 U. S. 500 (19 ), which in
turn is a variant of the "overt act" test of the pre-Vinson Court enun-
ciated in Dejenge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353 (1937). Between Elfbrandt
and Baggett, therefore, the jurisprudence of loyalty oath legislation
seems to have come full circle.
A BooK NAMED "JOHN CLELAND'S MEMOIRS OF A WOMAN OF PLEAS-
ORE" v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MASSACHUSETTS. U. S. ,86 S. Ct.
975, 15 L. Ed. 2d , No. 368. Decided March 21, 1966. Brennan,
J., for the Court; Black, Douglas and Stewart, JJ., concurring; Clark,
Harlan and White, JJ., dissenting. Reversed.
While not turning upon a specific constitutional issue, the so-called
"Fanny Hill" obscenity case is closely identified with the rationale in
the Ginzburg and Mishkin cases which follow. All three in turn con-
fronted the Court with the need to clarify (or retreat from) its doc-
trine in Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476 (1957) which established
that obscenity is "not within the area of constitutionally protected
speech and press." It remained, after Roth, to define obscenity within
the framework of various factual situations and with reference to the
general constitutional privilege adjudicated under the First Amend-
ment. Two of the cases-Ginzburg and Mishkin-found the factual
situation to support a determination of obscenity; the present case, in-
volving publication of a 1750 novel, found insufficient evidence of
obscenity. The test in Roth-a threefold requirement that the "dom-
inant theme of the material taken as a whole" appeals to prurient inter-
ests in sex, that it offends contemporary community standards and that
it is utterly devoid of redeeming social value-must be met in all dimen-
sions, said the Court.
Having asserted this much, however, the majority opinion appears
to hedge against the arguments of the dissent as well as against the
contrary holdings in the other two obscenity cases: Evidence that the
purveyor of the challenged publication was exploiting its sale through
"prurient appeal, to the exclusion of all other values," might justify
a court in accepting the purveyor's own evaluation of the work. The
constitutional protection of expression and publication would be ac-
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commodated, the majority opinion suggests, because the defendant in
a criminal prosecution for obscenity would be chargeable not for what
he said or believed but for what he did. The line of differentiation is
an obviously narrow one, if it exists at all; the fact that "Fanny Hill"
was reprinted by an established publisher and sold to a number of li-
braries and educational institutions reasonably raises a question of cred-
ibility in purveyor motivations which may make the "Fanny Hill" case
difficult to follow in the future.
GINZBURG V. UNITED STATES, U. S. , 86 S. Ct. 942, 15 L. Ed. 2d
34 Law Wk. No. 42. Decided March 21, 1966. On certiorari to
U. S. Court of Appeals for Third Circuit, 338 F. 2d 12 (19 ).
Brennan, J., for the Court; Douglas, Black, Harlan and Stewart, JJ.,
dissenting. Affirmed.
The majority in this case, applying the same general criteria set out
in the "Fanny Hill" case supra, found the record sufficient to sustain
defendant's conviction on pandering to prurient interests in publication,
publicity and sale of his periodicals. Cf. Note, infra.
MILLS v. ALABAMA, U. S., , 86 S. Ct. 1434, 15 L. Ed. 2d , 34
Law Wk. 4418. No. 597. Decided May 23, 1966. On appeal from
the Supreme Court of Alabama, 278 Ala. 188, 176 S. 2d 884 (19 ).
Black, J., for the Court; Douglas and Brennan, JJ., concurring. Re-
versed and remanded.
A rather astonishingly elemental issue of press freedom was presented
in this case, where the Alabama Corrupt Practices Act, Code Ala. 1940,
Tit. 17, §§ 268-286, was invoked against a newspaper which published
an editorial on election day urging voters to vote a certain way. The
attempted prosecution was based on a clause in the statute prohibiting
electioneering or soliciting of votes on the day of an election. Since,
as the Court pointed out, the fundamental objective of the First Amend-
ment was "to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs," there
was no merit to the state's contention that the admitted restraint upon
the press was "within the field of reasonableness."
MISHKIN v. NEw YORK, 382 U. S. , 56 S. Ct. 959, 15 L. Ed. 2d
34 Law Wk. 4250. No. 49. Decided March 21, 1966. On appeal
from the New York Court of Appeals, 15 N. Y. 2d 724, 256 N. Y. S.
2d 936, 205 N. E. 2d 201 (19 ). Brennan, J., for the Court; Black,
Douglas and Stewart, JJ., dissenting. Affirmed.
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This case completes the trilogy on obscenity developed supra in the
"Fanny Hill" and Ginzburg. Again, as in Ginzburg, the majority was
satisfied that a state finding of pandering to prurient interests by edi-
torial and advertising methods was within the expanded definition of
the Roth rule. The first two cases of the trilogy thus appear to be
almost in juxtaposition to each other, with a conviction to be upheld
if the court is convinced that the purveyor's acts demonstrate an over-
riding concern with attracting or arousing the prurient interest, but to
be set aside if the behavior of the purveyor is not so blatant as to sub-
ordinate the tests of contemporary community standards and possible
residual social value.
Mishkin in this perspective may be described as a gloss upon Ginz-
burg; where the Court is satisfied that the record demonstrates the
purveyor's appeal to deviant sex interests, ipso facto this appeal cannot
be found to conform with contemporary tolerances of the public in
general. Moreover, added the Court in the present case, scienter may
properly be attributed to the purveyor where the record shows his
detailed instructions to his commissioned writers and artists in prepar-
ing the material.
ROSENBLATT v. BAER, 383 U. S. 75, 86 S. Ct. 669, 15 L. Ed. 2d 547,
34 Law Wk. 4111. No. 38. Decided February 21, 1966. On cer-
tiorari to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 106 N. H. 26, 103
A. 2d 773 (19 ). Brennan, J., for the Court; Stewart, J., concurring
and Black, Douglas and Harlan, JJ., concurring in part; Fortas, J.,
dissenting. Reversed and remanded.
The shadow of Sullivan v. New York Times, 376 U. S. 254 (1964)
hung over this case and obviously accounted for the confusions of
tongues in the prevailing majority for the defendant in this libel suit.
Justices Harland and Stewart, as well as Justice Fortas, stressed in their
respective separate opinions that, the so-called New York Times rule,
not having been pronounced in the trial stages of this case, the petition
should have been dismissed as improvidently lodged. The four who
supported the formal opinion of the Court read by Justice Brennan in
effect reiterated and expanded the New York Times rule in applying
it to this case: An editorial attack upon a public official in his official
function cannot support an action of libel. Without specifically finding
that the plaintiff in this case, the manager of a public proprietary ac-
tivity (ski lift and recreation area), came within the public official
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designation, the Court set out as its criterion the proposition that "criti-
cism of those responsible for government operations must be free, lest
criticism of government itself be penalized." The result is to suggest
that the New York Times rule, which greatly enlarged the defense of
fair criticism as a defense to libel under the freedom of the press guar-
antees, is to be applied broadly rather than narrowly.
SHEPPARD V. MAXWELL, 383 U. S. , 86 S. Ct. 1507, 15 L. Ed. 2d
34 Law Wk. No. 490. Decided June 6, 1966. On certiorari to the
U. S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 346 F. 2d 707 (19 ).
Clark, J., for the Court; Black, J., dissenting. Reversed and remanded.
Blatant "trial by newspaper" is another dimension of press law within
the framework of the First Amendment which was significantly defined
in this case, upholding an original U. S. District Court finding that the
defendant's conviction was void for failure of the trial court to protect
the defendant from prejudicial publicity and disruptive courtroom
practices.
UNITED STATES V. JOHNSON, 383 U. S. 169, 86 S. Ct. 749, 15 L. Ed. 2d
681, 34 Law Wk. 4161. No. 25. Decided Feb. 24, 1966. On cer-
tiorari to the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 337
F. 2d 180 (19 ). Harlan, J., for the Court; Warren, CJ., and Bren-
nan and Douglas, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part; Black
and White, JJ., took no part in the case. Affirmed and remanded.
In the jurisprudence of free speech, the question presented in this
case was one of first impression: Is the absolute privilege accorded to
speeches on the floor of Congress dissipated by the accepting of money
directly or indirectly related to the speech? The defendant, a former
congressman, was alleged to have made a speech favorable to private
interests and to have sought to dissuade the government from institut-
ing a criminal proceeding against these interests. A contribution to the
congressman by the interests was applied to his campaign expenses.
The Court found that the immunity granted in Article I, sec. 6 of the
Constitution is absolute, tracing it back to the Parliamentary revolution
in seventeenth-century England. This interpretation would thus bar
inquiry by the judiciary into motives and influences which might lie
behind privileged communications. The defense of privilege, accord-
ingly, is significantly strengthened and thus complements the fair com-
ment defense already reinforced by the New York Times and Rosen-
blatt decisions (supra).
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UNITED STEEL WORKERS V. BOULIGNY, 382 U. S. 145, 86 S. Ct., 272,
15 L. Ed. 2d 217, 34 Law Wk. 4019. No. 19. Decided November
22, 1965. On certiorari to the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, 336 F. 2d 160 (19 ). Fortas, J., for the Court. Affirmed.
A final libel issue in this term of the Court was actually only the
setting for a procedural question on diversity jurisdiction, and its appli-
cability to an unincorporated labor union seeking to get into the Fed-
eral courts. The plaintiff was a North Carolina employer who brought
his action in the state court; the union sought removal to the Federal
court on the plea that it was an entity with citizenship in Pennsylvania
where its headquarters were situated. The U. S. District Court for the
Western District of North Carolina denied plaintiff's motion to remand
to the state court, but on an interlocutory appeal the U. S. Court of
Appeals reversed. Certiorari then was granted by the Supreme Court
to determine the diversity issue.
In affirming the appellate court's ruling and thus remanding the case
to the state courts, the unanimous opinion urged that the question re-
quired legislative rather than judicial remedy. So far as libel law is
concerned, the opinion would tend to encourage the limitation of
jurisdiction of the subject matter to state courts when the members of
an unincorporated group can be found to be residents of that state. So
far as the specific litigation in this instance was concerned, the decision
left open the question whether a state court proceeding may be super-
ceded by the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board.
CHEFF V. SCHNACKENBERG, 383 U. S. , 86 S. Ct. 1523, 15 L. Ed.
2d , 34 Law Wk. 4462. No. 67. Decided June 6, 1966. On cer-
tiorari to the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 341
F. 2d 548. Clark, J., for the Court; Harlan, J., concurring; Douglas
and Black, JJ., dissenting. White, J., took no part in the case.
Affirmed.
SHILLITANI V. UNITED STATES. PAPPALIO V. UNITED STATES. 383 U. S.
, 86 L. Ed. 1531, 15 L. Ed. 2d , 34 Law Wk. 4460. Nos.
412, 442. Decided June 6, 1966. On certiorari to the U. S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, 346 F. 2d 5. Clark, J., for the Court;
Black, J., concurring. White, J. took no part in the case. Judgments
vacated and cases remanded for dismissal.
See NOTE beginning p. 76 infra.
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